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Resilient Navigation for Autonomous Systems

When GNSS Can No Longer Be Taken for Granted – Resilient Navigation for Autonomous Systems

GNSS resilience is moving into focus

From 14 to 18 September 2026, GNSS manufacturers, researchers and system developers from around the world will meet again at Jammertest 2026 on Andøya, Norway. Under controlled real-world conditions, positioning and navigation systems will be exposed to GNSS jamming, meaconing and spoofing.

Events such as Jammertest illustrate a development that is becoming increasingly relevant for autonomous systems: reliable GNSS reception can no longer be taken for granted.

For UAVs and other autonomous platforms, this raises an important question: How should a navigation system respond when the RF environment itself becomes unreliable?

This is precisely the question behind the development of hensec REGINA-AIR.

With REGINA-Air, hensec introduces a compact solution combining resilient GNSS navigation with real-time interference awareness

Satellite navigation has become a fundamental part of many autonomous systems. UAVs, unmanned ground vehicles and mobile robots rely on GNSS for much more than determining their position. Position, velocity and precise timing information feed directly into navigation, flight control, mission planning and the georeferencing of sensor data.

This also makes GNSS a critical part of the overall system.

In an interference-free environment, this is usually unproblematic. In real-world operations, however, GNSS reception can be affected by other radio systems, unintentional emissions or deliberate jamming. Because satellite signals arrive at the receiver at extremely low power levels, even relatively modest interference can have a significant impact on GNSS performance.

For autonomous systems, the relevant question is therefore no longer simply how accurately a GNSS solution performs under ideal conditions, but how reliably it can operate in a challenging RF environment.

Resilience Has to Start Before the Receiver

A high-performance GNSS receiver is only one part of the solution.

Strong interference first reaches the antenna and RF signal path. If this part of the system is already overloaded or severely affected, subsequent signal-processing techniques can only do so much. Conversely, a resilient antenna alone is not sufficient if the receiver cannot effectively process the remaining satellite signals and mitigate interference.

With REGINA-Air, Hensec therefore follows a multi-layer approach.

The system combines jamming-resilient antenna technology from Calian with an advanced Septentrio GNSS receiver and a compact electronics and interface platform developed by Hensec.

Resilience starts at the RF input and continues at receiver level. Rather than relying on a single “anti-jamming” feature, the objective is to create a robust GNSS signal chain as an integrated system.

From GNSS Receiver to Integrated Navigation Module

For UAV applications in particular, GNSS performance alone is not enough. Size, weight, power supply, interfaces and software integration all determine whether a technology can be used effectively in a real platform.

REGINA-Air was therefore not developed as a loose combination of individual components.

The GNSS receiver is integrated into compact Hensec electronics that provide the navigation and status information required by the autonomous system in real time. This includes position, velocity and timing information. Via DroneCAN, the data can be provided directly to systems based on ArduPilot or PX4.

This moves a significant part of the integration effort from the system developer into the product itself.

Instead of separately integrating the antenna, GNSS receiver, power supply, interfaces and data communication, developers of autonomous platforms receive a solution designed specifically for this type of application.

Interference Is Valuable Information in Its Own Right

One aspect was particularly important during the development of REGINA-Air.

In a conventional GNSS installation, the primary interest is usually the navigation result. As long as a valid position is available, the RF environment itself often remains largely invisible to the higher-level system.

For an autonomous platform, however, this information can be highly valuable.

REGINA-Air therefore does not use information about detected GNSS interference solely for internal signal processing. Information about interference events can also be provided digitally to the host system.

The GNSS system effectively becomes a sensor for the local GNSS interference environment.

This opens up applications that go beyond improving navigation robustness. During a mission, for example, a UAV can detect interference and record it together with position and time. Interference events can then be georeferenced, logged and analysed after the mission.

With appropriate processing, this data can be used for mobile measurements or to create georeferenced representations of the GNSS interference environment.

Navigation and Situational Awareness Come Together

This combination is particularly relevant for autonomous systems.

The platform can not only attempt to maintain navigation under challenging conditions, but can simultaneously obtain information indicating that its electromagnetic environment has changed.

This information can be logged, transmitted to a ground station or made available to higher-level functions within the autonomous platform.

It adds another dimension to situational awareness. The relevant question is no longer only:

“Where am I?”

but also:

“Under what GNSS conditions am I currently operating?”

This is an important distinction between a conventional GNSS receiver and the system approach behind REGINA-Air.

Developed from Real UAV Requirements

REGINA-Air originated from specific requirements in the UAV environment. The challenge was not simply to combine different technologies, but to integrate them into a compact unit that could be used practically within an autonomous platform.

Three core functions emerged from this development:

NAVIGATE. DETECT. ANALYSE.

NAVIGATE represents resilient multi-band, multi-constellation GNSS navigation for demanding RF environments.

DETECT describes the ability to detect GNSS interference onboard and make this information available to the higher-level system in real time.

ANALYSE extends the concept by enabling the resulting data to be used for logging, measurements, georeferenced evaluation and post-mission analysis.

Together, these capabilities turn the GNSS subsystem into an active part of overall system awareness.

Resilient PNT Is Becoming a System-Level Requirement

As autonomy increases, so does the importance of the availability and reliability of positioning, navigation and timing information. At the same time, the electromagnetic environments in which autonomous systems operate are becoming increasingly complex.

For this reason, we believe that GNSS systems should no longer be assessed solely on their accuracy and sensitivity under optimal reception conditions.

Increasingly important is how a system responds to interference, what information it can provide about its own reception environment, and how easily this information can be integrated into the overall architecture of an autonomous platform.

REGINA-Air is Hensec's approach to bringing these requirements together in a compact solution: resilient GNSS navigation, digital interference detection and direct integration into autonomous systems.

Further technical information about REGINA-Air is available on our product page.

https://hensec.com/de/component/content/article/regina-air?catid=9

Further technical information about our Calian Jamming Resilient Antennas is available here::

https://hensec.com/de/produkte/gps/jamming-resiliente-crpa-antennen

 

 

 

 

GNSS, Jammer, Spoofer, spoofing, Septentrio, Calian

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New Study on GNSS Jamming in the Baltic Sea

New study shows: GNSS-disturbances in the southern Baltic Sea are significantly more complex and stronger than previously assumed

A new investigation builds on our earlier report on GNSS-interferences in the Baltic Sea region (with GPSPatron and the Gdynia Maritime University) — but this time with a crucial difference: instead of a fixed sensor on land, the interference detector GP-Probe TGE2 was installed directly aboard a research vessel. The ship operated between 23 June and 14 October 2025 throughout the southern Baltic Sea region and regularly approached the maritime border region to Kaliningrad.

By using this mobile measurement platform, the actual GNSS environment encountered by vessels could be captured — including effects that are not visible from land.

Key findings

  1. Shift to combined spoofing and jamming attacks
    While the earlier coastal study exclusively showed multi-constellation jamming, the new shipborne campaign reveals a different picture:

    • GPS-L1 spoofing with artificial satellite signals.

    • Simultaneous jamming of GLONASS, Galileo and BeiDou.
      This forces receivers to use only the fake GPS signals — a technically efficient, yet highly effective interference with navigation.

  2. Highest disturbance intensity measured so far
    At the end of June to July the strongest disturbances occurred:

    • GNSS availability dropped to 83.5 %.

    • Over 4 days of spoofing were registered.
      The most extreme incident: almost 30 hours of continuous spoofing from 1 to 3 July — a serious risk for shipping.

  3. Multiple jamming transmitters working synchronously
    The data clearly shows: the interferences originate from four different, coordinated sources — including a GPS-spoofer, two chirp-jammers and a broadband analog jammer.
    Different spectra and bandwidths point to spatially separate installations, yet centrally controlled activation.

  4. Significant change in technology
    Compared to the earlier study:

    • fewer but more powerful chirp-jammers.

    • a combination of older high-power RF technology with newer spoofing capability.
      The interference landscape is thus becoming technically more heterogeneous and unpredictable.

  5. Disturbances increase significantly at sea
    Measurements show a clear spatial trend:

    • In the port of Gdańsk: weak.

    • On the open sea: up to 15 dB stronger.

    • Strongest values were observed when heading toward Kaliningrad.
      This means that navigation zones at sea are particularly affected by the disturbances.

Request the full report

The complete report with spectrograms, signal analyses and technical details is available for download. To download: simply fill out the email form.
If you have any questions or need further information on this topic, we are happy to assist via email.

 

hensec_gpspatron-report-shipborne-observations-near-the-kaliningrad-border

Full Report of the GNSS Jamming and Spoofing Analysis in the Baltic Sea

hensec_gpspatron-report-shipborne-observations-near-the-kaliningrad-border.pdf (3.31 MB)
Download

GNSS, Galileo, Jammer, Spoofer, spoofing, jamming, Baltic Jammer, Ostsee

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GNSS Security on Sea - new Vessel Mode

hensec Now Offering GPSPATRON’s New Maritime GNSS Interference Detection Algorithms

hensec is proud to announce that we now offer GPSPATRON’s newly introduced “Vessel” processing mode, a cutting-edge algorithm suite designed specifically for maritime GNSS interference detection. The new mode is available both in the GP-Cloud platform and in onboard devices such as the GP-Probe DIN L1, making it suitable for ships, port facilities, coastal monitoring systems, and offshore infrastructure.

GNSS interference—whether caused by jamming or spoofing—has become an increasingly common threat at sea. Vessels are particularly exposed, and disruptions can affect navigation, AIS data integrity, port operations, offshore activities, and time-critical onboard systems. GPSPATRON’s new vessel-focused algorithms significantly enhance detection accuracy by taking vessel motion and maritime signal characteristics into account.

With this update, maritime operators can benefit from:

  • Real-time GNSS interference detection

  • Centralized monitoring and analytics through GP-Cloud

  • Reliable onboard detection even without network connectivity

  • Improved situational awareness and operational safety

At hensec, we support the full integration of these capabilities into your maritime operations—whether for individual vessels, entire fleets, or port-wide monitoring.

If you are interested in deploying GPSPATRON’s Vessel algorithms or would like expert guidance on GNSS interference protection, feel free to reach out to us. We’re happy to advise and support your implementation.

GNSS, GPS, Jammer, Maritim

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Drone Security at Events

When the sky becomes the stage: The growing challenge of drone security at large events

Drone shows have evolved into a fascinating spectacle in recent years. They transform the night sky into choreographed light displays, tell stories, and are increasingly replacing traditional fireworks at major events—from city festivals to corporate gatherings. At the same time, drones are also used operationally—for media coverage or security surveillance—over event areas. But behind the visual appeal and practical benefits lie growing and often underestimated security risks that require a rethinking of protection concepts.

Fragility of drone technology at large scale deployments

Recent incidents have painfully highlighted the fragility of this technology in public spaces. Whether it’s the anxiety over staging an elaborate drone show under adverse weather conditions or reports of individual drone crashes—the potential dangers drones pose when control is lost are evident. Even a small drone crashing can pose a serious risk to the safety of spectators. Causes for loss of control are varied: technical defects, pilot error, or environmental factors like strong winds.

An especially insidious and increasingly relevant threat is electronic interference. Many modern drones rely heavily on satellite navigation systems (GNSS) such as GPS, Galileo, and GLONASS for navigation and positioning. These systems provide highly precise location data essential for following complex flight paths in shows or for autonomous drone behavior. However, GNSS signals are relatively vulnerable to external influences. So-called “jamming” simply blocks these signals, while “spoofing” sends fake position and time signals, which can divert a drone off course or even guide it deliberately to the wrong location. Such disruptions can occur unintentionally—due to faulty devices—but can also be deliberately used to manipulate or crash drones, whether maliciously, for sabotage, or simply mischief.

For organizers of large events, especially those relying on drone shows or expecting numerous drones over their site, the urgent question arises: How can safety in the low-altitude airspace above the event be ensured? Traditional security concepts focused on physical access to the venue fall short. The threat comes from the air—and is often invisible.

Combining security technologies

An effective response to this complex threat requires a multi-layered technological solution. At its core, this involves combining two crucial capabilities:

First, continuous monitoring of GNSS signal quality. Specialized sensors can detect in real time whether satellite signals are being jammed or spoofed. Detecting such disruptions allows for immediate reaction—for example, aborting a drone show before individual drones become uncontrollable or perform incorrect maneuvers due to signal loss.

Second, modern drone detection capable of identifying all flying objects in the relevant airspace, regardless of whether they are cooperative (transmitting transponder signals) or not. Such systems often use a combination of sensor technologies to reliably detect unknown or potentially hostile drones.

Only the intelligent linking of these two detection approaches—monitoring the navigation base (GNSS) and direct detection of flying objects (drone detection)—creates a comprehensive situational picture of the airspace over an event. Such an integrated platform enables improved real-time situational awareness and provides a solid basis for risk mitigation decisions.

The benefits of such combined technology go beyond pure threat defense. Precise detection allows collecting evidence and detailed analysis after incidents, which is crucial for clarifying causes (such as unexplained crashes) or insurance issues. Furthermore, the system provides significant organizational value to the event organizer: authorized drones, for example from media partners or emergency services, can be automatically identified and assigned to responsible personnel. This simplifies coordination of approved air traffic and allows faster differentiation between desired flights and potential threats.

The need for integrated solutions combining GNSS interference monitoring with advanced drone detection is underscored by the rising number of drones in public spaces and the increasing sophistication of possible interference attempts. While specialized technologies exist for individual aspects, it is the holistic view and provision of a combined solution from a single source that can make the decisive difference for the safety of large events in the era of unmanned aviation. Projects using advanced GNSS interference detection technology at major drone shows have confirmed the feasibility and added value of this approach in practice.

Ensuring safety at events involving drones requires a shift from passive protection measures toward proactive monitoring and integrated situational awareness. Only through consistent implementation of robust technologies that monitor both the drones themselves and their navigation environment can the full potential of drone shows and other applications be safely harnessed, minimizing risks to spectators and participants. Investing in these technologies is an investment in the safety and smooth operation of large events.

Integrated solution for GNSS monitoring and drone detection

The security company hensec is currently the only provider offering a comprehensive and integrated solution combining GNSS quality monitoring (spoofing and jamming detection) with modern drone detection that also identifies non-cooperative drones. Conventional jamming detection systems only detect that a signal is unreliable but cannot distinguish between interference, jamming, or spoofing. In other words: They detect that “something” is wrong, but not “what.” The hensec solution, by contrast, provides a comprehensive analysis of GNSS signal quality from many perspectives, so even sophisticated spoofing attacks are detected and immediately countered, for example by blocking hostile radio signals.

In addition to customized solutions for corporate sites, cities, or entire regions, hensec also offers a portable suitcase system as a rental solution specifically designed to counter threats from unauthorized drone flights over event areas. The suitcase detects 99% of all common drones and alarms as soon as an object approaches the defined no-fly zone. Alongside the drone type, exact position, and drone ID, the integrated map also shows the drone pilot’s location—often the most critical information in concrete operations. Importantly, the anti-drone suitcase generates no interference with radio communications such as stage equipment and is not even noticed by visitors. An autonomous power supply facilitates on-site use.

More information: www.hensec.com www.luftraumueberwachung.com

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GPS Spoofing and Jamming Video GPN

GPS Spoofing und Jamming Video

Video zum Talk auf der GPN22 über die Gefahren des GPS-Spoofings sowie der Technik und Detektionsmethoden.

GPS / GNSS Jamming und Spoofing ist zu einer ernstzunehmenden Gefahr für Verkehr, Navigation und kritische Infrastrukturen geworden. Wir betrachten die damit verbundenen Risiken sowie Hintergründe, Geschichte, Technologien und Abwehrmaßnahmen.

In den letzten Monaten sind die GNSS Jamming und Spoofing Vorfälle weltweit signifikant angestiegen – vor allem, aber nicht nur, rund um die Krisenherde unseres Planeten. Zum Verstehen der Hintergründe werfen wir einen Blick auf die Geschichte des Spoofings und die Technik hinter GNSS und PNT.
Ebenso schauen wir uns anhand echter Beispiele aktuelle Jamming und Spoofing Technologien an.
Welche realen Risiken ergeben sich daraus für den Flugverkehr und kritische Infrastrukturen?
Wie lässt sich durch technologische und organisatorische Maßnahmen die Resilienz bestehender Systeme erhöhen?

Hier auch der Link zum Runterladen des GPS-Jamming Talks „GPS Spoofing und Jamming – Techniken, Risiken und Detektion“ auf media.ccc.de:

https://media.ccc.de/v/gpn22-403-gps-spoofing-und-jamming-techniken-risiken-und-detektion

 

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